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ABSTRACT
The growth of the sharing economy is driven by the emer-
gence of sharing platforms, e.g., Uber and Lyft, that match
owners looking to share their resources with customers look-
ing to rent them. The design of such platforms is a complex
mixture of economics and engineering, and how to “opti-
mally”design such platforms is still an open problem. In this
paper, we focus on the design of prices and subsidies in shar-
ing platforms. Our results provide insights into the tradeoff
between revenue maximizing prices and social welfare max-
imizing prices. Specifically, we introduce a novel model of
sharing platforms and characterize the profit and social wel-
fare maximizing prices in this model. Further, we bound the
efficiency loss under profit maximizing prices, showing that
there is a strong alignment between profit and efficiency in
practical settings. Our results highlight that the revenue of
platforms may be limited in practice due to supply short-
ages; thus platforms have a strong incentive to encourage
sharing via subsidies. We provide an analytic characteriza-
tion of when such subsidies are valuable and show how to
optimize the size of the subsidy provided. Finally, we val-
idate the insights from our analysis using data from Didi
Chuxing, the largest ridesharing platform in China.
1. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the sharing economy is driven by the emer-
gence of sharing platforms that facilitate exchange, e.g.,
Uber, Lyft, and Didi Chuxing. While initially limited to
a few industries, e.g., ridesharing, sharing platforms have
now emerged in diverse areas including household tasks, e.g.,
TaskRabbit, rental housing, e.g., Airbnb, HomeAway; food
delivery, e.g., UberEATS, and more.
The sharing economies governed by these platforms are
inherently two-sided markets: owners on one side look to
rent access to some product and renters/customers on the
other side look to use that product for a limited time period.
The role of sharing platforms in this two-sided market is
to facilitate matches between those looking to share and
those looking to rent, a process that would be very difficult
without a central exchange.
Since sharing platforms do not own their own products,
their goal is mainly to act as an intermediary that ensures
the availability of supply (shared resources), while maintain-
ing high satisfaction in transactions that happen through
the platform. The determination of prices and matches by
a sharing platform is the key mechanism for accomplishing
this goal – and it is a difficult, complex task that has sig-
nificant impact on profit of the platform and satisfaction of
the users, both owners and renters.
Sharing platforms today are diverse, both in how matches
are assigned and in how prices are determined. Even within
a single industry, e.g., ridesharing, platforms use contrast-
ing approaches for pricing and matching. For example, Uber
slashed the fares in US in January 2016 and began to subsi-
dize drivers heavily, while Lyft remained a relatively higher
price option [4]. These varied approaches to pricing highlight
the limited understanding currently available about the im-
pact of different approaches on profit and user satisfaction
– companies do not agree on an “optimal” approach.
This lack of understanding exists despite a large literature
in economics studying two-sided markets, e.g., [31, 34, 29].
This gap stems from the fact that, while sharing platforms
are examples of two-sided markets, the traditional research
on two-sided markets often does not apply to sharing plat-
forms due to assumptions made about the form of utilities
and interactions across the markets. Sharing platforms are
faced with asymmetries between renters and owners, as well
as non-traditional utility functions as a result of trading off
the benefits of sharing with the benefits of personal usage.
This paper seeks to provide new insight into two related,
important design choices in sharing platforms: the design of
prices and subsidies.
How a sharing platform sets prices has a crucial impact
on both the availability of shared resources and the demand
from customers for the shared resources. A platform must
provide incentives for sharing that ensure enough supply,
while also keeping prices low enough that customers are will-
ing to pay for the service.
This tradeoff is often difficult for sharing platforms to sat-
isfy, especially in their early stages, and sharing platforms
typically find themselves fighting to avoid supply shortages
by giving subsidies for sharing. In fact, according to [15],
Didi spends up to $4 billion on subsidies per year.
Not surprisingly, sharing platforms carefully optimize prices
and subsidies, often keeping the details of their approaches
secret. However, it is safe to assume that sharing plat-
forms typically approach the design question with an eye
on optimizing revenue obtained by the platform (via trans-
action fees). In contrast, a driving motivation for the shar-
ing economy is to encourage efficient resource pooling and
thus achieving social welfare improvements through better
utilization of resources. Thus, a natural question is “Do
revenue maximizing sharing platforms (nearly) optimize the
social welfare achievable through resource pooling?” Said dif-
ferently, “Do sharing platforms achieve market efficiency or
is there inefficiency created by revenue-seeking platforms?”
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Contributions of this paper. This paper adapts classical
model of two-sided markets to the case of sharing platforms
and uses this new model to guide the design of prices and
subsidies in sharing platforms. The paper makes four main
contributions to the literatures on two-sided markets and
sharing platforms.
First, this paper introduces a novel model of a two-sided
market within the sharing economy. Our model consists of a
sharing platform, a set of product owners who are interested
in sharing the product, and a set of product users (renters).
In classic two sided markets, users on both sides benefit from
the increasing size of the other side, e.g., their benefits are
linear to the size of the others. Maximizing the size of the
market is the key problem for the platform. Our model is
different from the classic two-sided model in that we consider
asymmetric market, i.e., product owners can benefit from
either renting their resource or using it themselves.
Second, within our novel two-sided market model of a
sharing platform, we prove existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium and derive structural properties of mar-
ket behavior as a function of the pricing strategy used by
the sharing platform. These results allow the characteriza-
tion and comparison of pricing strategies that (i) maximize
revenue and (ii) maximize social welfare. Our results high-
light that revenue maximizing prices are always at least as
large as social welfare maximizing prices (Theorem 3) and,
further, that the welfare loss from revenue maximization is
small (Theorem 4). Thus, revenue-maximizing sharing plat-
forms achieve nearly all of the gains possible from resource
pooling through the sharing economy. Interestingly, our re-
sults also highlight that revenue maximizing prices lead to
more sharing (higher supply) compared to welfare maximiz-
ing pricing. Finally, perhaps counter-intuitively, our results
show that revenue maximizing prices and social welfare max-
imizing prices align in situations where the market is “con-
gested”, i.e., where the sharing supply is low. This is the
operating regime of many sharing platforms, and so our re-
sults suggest that sharing platforms are likely operating in
a regime where business and societal goals are aligned.
Third, we provide results characterizing the impact of sub-
sidies for sharing, and derive the optimal subsidies for max-
imizing revenue. The fact that many sharing platforms are
operating in “congested” regimes means that it is crucial for
them to find ways to encourage sharing, and the most com-
mon approach is to subsidize sharing. Theorem 7 character-
izes the market equilibrium as a function of the subsidy pro-
vided by the platform. These results thus allow the platform
to choose a subsidy that optimizes revenue (or some other
objectives), including the costs of the subsidies themselves.
Importantly, the results highlight that small subsidies can
have a dramatic impact on the available supply.
Finally, the fourth contribution of the paper is an empiri-
cal exploration of a sharing platform in order to ground the
theoretical work in the paper (Section 5). In particular, we
use data from Didi Chuxing, the largest ridesharing platform
in China, to fit and validate our model, and also to explore
the insights from our theorems in practical settings. Our re-
sults highlight that, in practical settings, revenue maximiz-
ing pricing shows close alignment with welfare maximizing
pricing. Further, we explore the impact of supply-side regu-
lation (e.g., gas taxes) as a method for curbing over-supply
in sharing platforms. Our results show that such approaches
can have an impact, and that the reduction is felt entirely
by the product owners (not the sharing platform).
Related literature. Our paper is related to two distinct
literatures: (i) empirical work studying the sharing economy,
and (ii) analytical work studying two-sided markets.
Empirical studies of the sharing economy. There is
a growing literature studying the operation of the sharing
economy. Much of this work is empirical, focused on quan-
tifying the benefits and drawbacks of the sharing economy
[10, 14, 26], the operation of existing sharing platforms [8,
36], and the social consequences of current designs [27, 35].
An important insight from these literature relevant to the
model in the current paper is that the expected economic
benefits of owners due to sharing significantly influence the
level of participation in sharing platforms [18, 24]. Thus,
prices and subsidies do impact the degree to which own-
ers participate in the sharing economy. Similarly, studies
have shown that prices have a dramatic impact on demand
in sharing platforms, e.g., [7] conducts experiments in San
Francisco and Manhattan to show that Uber’s surge pricing
dramatically decreases demand.
Analytical studies of two-sided markets. There is a
large literature on two-sided markets in the economics com-
munity, e.g., see [31, 34, 29] and the references therein for an
overview. These papers typically focus on situations where
users on one side of the market benefit from participation
on the other side of the market. Hence, the goal of the
platform is to increase the population on both sides. How-
ever, the models considered in this literature do not apply
to sharing platforms, as we discuss in detail in Section 2.
That said, there is a small, but growing, set of papers
that attempts to adapt models of two-sided markets in or-
der to study sharing platforms. These papers tend to focus
on a specific feature of a specific sharing platform, e.g., dy-
namic pricing for ridesharing. Most related to the current
paper are [3] and [21], which study platform strategies and
social welfare assuming users have fixed usage value. An-
other related paper is [11], which compares the utility of
dedicated and flexible sellers, showing that cost is the key
factor that influences participation of sellers. Finally, [5]
analyzes competition among providers, and shows that the
commonly adopted commission contract, i.e., platform ex-
tracts commission fee at a fixed ratio from transaction value,
is nearly optimal.
Our work differs significantly from each of the above men-
tioned papers. In particular, we consider heterogenous users
with general concave utility functions, while prior works of-
ten consider only linear utilities or adopt a specific form of
utility functions among homogeneous users. Additionally,
in our model, each user’s private information is not revealed
to others or the platform, while many results in prior work
is based on known knowledge of user utilities. Further, un-
like the agents in traditional models of two-sided markets,
product providers in sharing platform can benefit from ei-
ther self-usage of the products or sharing. This asymmetry
significantly impacts the analysis and results. Finally, our
work is unique among the analytic studies of sharing plat-
forms in that we use data from Didi Chuxing to fit our model
and validate the insights.
2. MODELING A SHARING PLATFORM
This paper seeks to provide insight into the design of
prices and subsidies in a sharing platform. To that end,
we begin by presenting a novel analytic model for the in-
teraction of agents within a sharing platform. The model
is a variation of traditional models for two-sided markets,
e.g., [29, 34], that includes important adjustments to capture
the asymmetries created by interactions between owners and
renters in a sharing platform. To ground our modeling, we
discuss the model in terms of ride-sharing and use data from
Didi Chuxing [33] to guide our modeling choices.
2.1 Model preliminaries
We consider a marketplace consisting of a sharing plat-
form and two groups of users: (i) owners, denoted by the
set O, and (ii) renters, denoted by R. For example, in a
ridesharing platform, owners are those that sometimes use
their car themselves and other times rent their car through
the platform, e.g., Uber or Didi Chuxing, and renters are
those that use the platform to get rides.
We use NO = |O| and NR = |R| to denote the number of
owners and renters, respectively, and assume that NO ≥ 2.1
For each user in O ∪ R, we normalize the maximum usage
to be 1. This should be thought of as the product usage
frequency. For product owner i, let xi ∈ [0, 1] denote the
self-usage level, e.g., the fraction of time the owner uses the
product personally. Further, let si ∈ [0, 1] denote the level
at which the owner shares the product on the platform, e.g.,
drives his or her car in a ridesharing service. Note that we
always have xi+si ≤ 1. For a renter k ∈ R, we use yk ∈ [0, 1]
to denote the usage level of the product, e.g., the fraction of
time when using a ridesharing service.
Sharing takes place over the platform. In our model, the
sharing platform first sets a (homogenous) market price p.2
Think of this price as a price per time for renting a prod-
uct through the platform. For example, prices in the Didi
data set we describe in Section 5 are approximately affine in
length.3
Renters pay the market price for renting a product from
owners. Depending on the self-usage preferences and the
market price, owners choose their own xi and si values (yk
for product renters), which together result in different de-
mand and supply conditions in the system. We describe the
models that govern these choices in the subsections below.
The aggregate choices are summarized by the following
notation: S(p) is the total sharing supply and D(p) the total
1The case when NO = 1 is the monopoly case. It is not the
main focus of this paper and can be analyzed in a straight-
forward manner (though the argument is different from the
one used for the case discussed in this paper).
2We consider homogeneous prices for simplicity of exposi-
tion. One could also consider heterogeneous prices by intro-
ducing different types of owners and renters and parameter-
izing their utility functions appropriately. The structure of
the model and results remain in such an extension.
3Note that ridesharing platforms typically use dynamic pric-
ing. Dynamic pricing is not the focus of our paper. Our
focus is on determining optimal prices and subsidies for a
given time. Thus, our model considers only a static point
in time and is not appropriate for a study of dynamic pric-
ing. Interested readers should refer to [2] for a complemen-
tary, recent work specifically focused on dynamic pricing in
ridesharing platforms. Interestingly, [2] shows that dynamic
pricing does not yield higher efficiency than static pricing,
though it does provide improved robustness.
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Figure 1: Waiting time is typically short: average
ETA of UberX in Washington D.C. is 5.5min and
96% requests has ETA less than 10min, which is much
better than taxi [32].
demand (renting demand) in the market under price p, i.e.,
S(p) =
∑
i∈O
si(p), D(p) =
∑
k∈R
yk(p). (1)
With the notation and terminology set, we now focus on
the detailed models of the strategic interactions between
owners, renters, and the platform.
2.2 Modeling renters
For each user k ∈ R, we denote the usage benefit obtained
from using the product, e.g., convenience or personal satis-
faction, by gk(yk). We assume that gk is only known to the
renter and is not public knowledge.
The utility a renter k obtains from product usage yk,
Uk(yk), is given by the benefit gk minus the cost to rent
the product, p, times the usage yk. Hence,
Uk(yk) = gk(yk)− pyk. (2)
Naturally, each renter k chooses demand yk to maximize
utility, i.e.,
max
yk
Uk(yk) s.t. 0 ≤ yk ≤ 1. (3)
For analytic reasons, we assume that gk(y) is continuous
and strictly concave with gk(0) = 0. Moreover, we assume
that ∂+gk(0) ≤ B for some B > 0, where ∂+gk(0) is the right
derivative of gk(y) at y = 0. Note that concavity, continuity,
and bounded derivatives are standard assumptions in the
utility analysis literature, e.g., [30, 28].
The key assumption in the model above is that we are
modeling the choice of renters as being primarily a function
of price. This choice is motivated by data from ridesharing
services such as Uber and Didi. In particular, one may won-
der if the impact of price is modulated by other factors, e.g.,
estimated time of arrival (ETA). However, data indicates
that these other factors play a much smaller role. This is
because, in most cases, the ETA is small, and hence differ-
ences in ETA are less salient than differences in price. For
instance, Figure 1 shows the real ETA statistics of UberX
in the Washington D.C. area for 6.97 million requests (from
dataset [32]). Notice that the average waiting time is 5.5
minutes and 96% of requests have an ETA less than 10 min-
utes. Within that scale, wait times do not have a major
impact on user behavior [25].
In contrast, price fluctuations have a significant impact on
user behavior. To highlight this, consider Figure 6, which
shows data we have obtained from 395,938 transactions in
Didi. (We introduce and explore this data set in detail in
Section 5.) This data set highlights that price fluctuations
have a significant impact on user behavior. Further, it can
be used to reverse engineer a realistic model of what renter
utility functions may look like in practice. In particular, the
following concave form fits the data well (see Section 5 for
more details):
gk(yk) =
1
β
(yk + yk log(
α
NR
)− yk log yk).
Beyond ridesharing, price can also be seen to play the pri-
mary role in renter decision making in other sharing econ-
omy platforms as well. For example, in Airbnb, since des-
tination cities and dates are usually subject to travelers’
schedule, price becomes a main concern for renters.
2.3 Modeling owners
The key distinction between owners and renters is that
owners have two ways to derive benefits from the product –
using it themselves or renting it through the platform.
When owners use the product themselves, they experience
benefit from the usage, like renters. But, unlike renters, they
do not have to pay the platform for their usage, though their
usage does incur wear-and-tear and thus leads to mainte-
nance costs. We denote the benefit from self-usage by fi(xi)
and the maintenance costs incurred by cxi, where c ≥ 0 is
a constant representing the usage cost per unit, e.g., gaso-
line, house keeping, or government tax. As in the case of
renters, we assume that, for all owners, fi(·) is continuous
and strictly concave with fi(0) = 0 and ∂+fi(0) ≤ B.
When the owners share their product through the plat-
form, they receive income; however they also incur costs.
Crucially, the income they receive from sharing depends on
how many renters are present and how many other owners
are sharing, and thus competing for renters.
We model the competition between owners via the follow-
ing simple equation for the income received while sharing:
pmin{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}si. (4)
Here min{D(p)
S(p)
, 1} denotes the probability that an owner is
matched to a renter. This models a “fair” platform that is
equally likely to assign a renter to any owner in the system.
Note that fairness among owners is crucial for encouraging
participation in platforms. In a “fair” platform min{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}
is the fraction of time owner i makes money from sharing,
e.g., the fraction of time a driver in Uber has a rider. Thus,
pmin{D(p)
S(p
, 1} can be viewed as the revenue stream that
an owner sees while sharing.4 Finally, an owner also incurs
maintenance costs as a result of sharing. We denote these
costs by csi as in the case of self-usage.
Combining the three components of an owner’s cost and
reward yields an overall utility for owner i of
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) + pmin{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}si − cxi − csi. (5)
Naturally, each owner i determines sharing and self-use
levels si and xi by optimizing (5), i.e., choosing x
∗
i (p) and
s∗i (p) by solving the following optimization problem:
max
xi,si
Ui(xi, si), s.t. xi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0, si + xi ≤ 1. (6)
4Similar utility functions have been adopted for studying
resources allocation problems with symmetric users in other
contexts, e.g., [12] and [23].
Crucially, the utility function above couples every owner’s
utility and thus the model yields a game once the sharing
price p is set by the platform.
It is important to emphasize the asymmetry of the owner
and renter models. This asymmetry captures the fact that
product owners often stay for longer time in the sharing
platform. Hence, they choose their self-usage and sharing
levels based on the long term overall payoff (represented by
price times the long term fraction of time they are matched
to requests, i.e., pmin{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}). In contrast, renters can
be seen as “short term” participants who care mainly about
whether they can get access to the product with reason-
able price each time they need. The contrast between short
term price-sensitive consumers and long term providers is
common in the literature, especially in the context of online
sharing [5, 2]. There is empirical support for this distinction
in both academia [7] and industry (Uber) [17].
Finally, it is also important to highlight that the owner
and renter models are very distinct from typical models
in the literature on two-sided markets, e.g., [34] [29], since
providers can benefit either from self-usage or sharing, and
owners and renters determine their actions asymmetrically.
2.4 Modeling the platform
The owners and renters discussed above interact through
a sharing platform. The platform matches the owners and
the renters and sets a price for exchange of services. Our
focus in this paper is not on algorithms for matching, but
rather on the pricing decision.
Note that, given a market price charged by the platform,
the owners and renters play a game. Thus, to begin, we need
to define the equilibrium concept we consider. Specifically,
denote X∗ = (x∗i , i ∈ O) and S∗ = (s∗i , i ∈ O). Then, a
state (X∗, S∗) is called a Nash equilibrium, if (x∗i , s
∗
i ) is an
optimal solution to problem (6) for all i ∈ O.
Importantly, every price chosen by the platform yields a
different game and, therefore, a (potentially) different set of
Nash equilibria. Thus, the goal of the platform is to choose a
price such that (i) there exists a Nash equilibrium (ideally a
unique Nash equilibrium) and (ii) the Nash equilibria maxi-
mize a desired objective. Our focus in this paper is on two
common objectives: revenue maximization and social
welfare maximization.
Revenue maximization and social welfare maximization
represent the two dominant regimes under which sharing
economy platforms aim to operate. A platform focused on
maximizing short term profits may seek to optimize the rev-
enue obtained at equilibrium, while a platform focused on
long-term growth may seek to optimize the social welfare
obtained by owners and renters.
More formally, when aiming to maximize social welfare,
the platform’s objective is to maximize the following aggre-
gate welfare
W (p) ,
∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i , s
∗
i ) +
∑
k∈R
Uk(y
∗
k), (7)
where x∗i , s
∗
i , and y
∗
k are the optimal actions by users under
the price p. Notice that the welfare is defined over all possi-
ble uniform price policies. An optimal social welfare policy
maximizes W (p) by choosing the optimal p.
In contrast, when aiming to maximize revenue, the plat-
form tries to maximize
R(p) , pmin{D(p), S(p)}. (8)
The adoption of this objective is motivated by the fact that
in many sharing systems, the platform obtains a commis-
sion from each successful transaction, e.g., Uber charges its
drivers 20% commission fee [20]. Thus, maximizing the to-
tal transaction volume is equivalent to maximizing the plat-
form’s revenue.
In both cases, to ensure non-trivial marketplace governed
by the platform, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (The market is profitable). There ex-
ists at least one price p such that pD(p) ≥ c.
This assumption is not restrictive and is used only to ensure
that there are owners interested in sharing. Specifically, if no
such price exists, it means that the term pmin{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}si −
csi < 0 in (5).
Assumption 2 (No owner has a monopoly). For any
owner i ∈ O, ∂−fi(1) < po, where ∂−fi(1) is the left deriva-
tive of fi(xi) at xi = 1 and D(po) = 1.
It is not immediately clear from the statement, but this
assumption ensures that, when S(p) > 0, at least two owners
will be sharing in the platform. More specifically, Assump-
tion 2 essentially requires that product owners’ per-unit self-
use utilities are upper bounded by some po, such that they
will at least start to share their products when price is high
enough that only 1 demand is left in the market. A formal
connection between the technical statement and the lack of
a monopoly owner is given in [1].
3. PLATFORM PRICING
The first contribution of this paper is a set of analytic
results describing how a sharing platform can design prices
that maximize revenue and social welfare. To obtain these
results we first characterize the equilibria among owners and
renters for any fixed market price set by the platform (Sec-
tion 3.1). These results are the building block that allow
the characterization of the prices that maximize social wel-
fare and revenue of the platform (Section 3.2). Then, using
these characterizations, we contrast the prices and the re-
sulting efficiency of the two approaches for platform pricing.
Throughout, the key technical challenge is the coupling
created by the inclusion of S(p) in the utility functions. This
coupling adds complexity to the arguments and so all de-
tailed proofs are deferred to the appendices in the extended
technical report [1].
3.1 Characterization of equilibria
In order to study optimal pricing, we must first char-
acterize the equilibria among owners and renters given a
fixed market price. In this subsection we establish structural
properties of the sharing behavior, including the existence of
an equilibrium and the monotonicity of supply and demand.
To begin, define a quantity pupper, which will be shown to
be an upper bound on market prices, as follows:
pupper , sup{p | pD(p) = c}. (9)
Note that pupper always exists due to Assumption 1. Fur-
ther, pD(p) is continuous (see the extended version [1]).
Using pupper, we can characterize the market as operating
in one of four regimes, depending on the market price.
Theorem 1. For any given market price p, there exists a
Nash equilibrium. Moreover, equilibrium is unique if fi(·) is
differentiable. In addition, equilibrium behavior of the mar-
ket falls into one of the following four regimes:
(i) p ∈ [0, pc): S(p) < D(p) and S(p) is non-decreasing
(ii) p = pc: S(p) = D(p)
(iii) p ∈ (pc, pupper]: S(p) ≥ D(p)
(iv) p > pupper: S(p) = 0
Some important remarks about Theorem 1 follow. First,
existence and uniqueness of market equilibrium under any
fixed sharing price is critical for analysis of the market.
Second, the price pc is the lowest market clearing price,
i.e., pc = min{p |D(p) = S(p)}. Establishing this result is
not straightforward due to the discontinuity of the derivative
of the coupling term min{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}, which can potentially
generate discontinuous points in the S(p) function as owners
may find sharing more valuable if there is a slight change in
price. Thus, the proposition is proven by carefully analyzing
the S(p) function around pc.
Third, as p increases, supply will continue to increase as
long as it is less than demand. However, once supply exceeds
demand, it remains larger than demand until, when the price
is higher than some threshold price pupper, supply drops to
0 since the market is not profitable.
Finally, note that regimes (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 are
the most practically relevant regimes since sharing demand
can all be fulfilled. In this regime, we can additionally prove
the desirable property that the platform’s goal of revenue
maximization is aligned with boosting sharing supply, i.e.,
a price for higher revenue leads to higher supply.
Theorem 2. For all p > pc such that S(p) > D(p), sup-
ply is higher when revenue is higher, i.e, p1D(p1) ≥ p2D(p2)
implies S(p1) ≥ S(p2).
An important observation about Theorem 2 is that rev-
enue maximization oriented sharing actually encourages more
sharing from owners. This is a result that is consistent with
what has been observed in the sharing economy literature,
e.g., [6]. The intuition behind this result is that the pur-
suit of actual trading volume pD(p) is in owners’ interests,
and this objective increases their enthusiasm for sharing. To
be specific, the “effective price” pD(p)
S(p)
seen by an owner has
pD(p), the transaction volume, as the numerator. There-
fore, a higher trading volume magnifies the “effective price,”
which in turn stimulates supply.
3.2 Social welfare and revenue maximization
Given the characterization of equilibria outcomes in the
previous subsection, we can now investigate how a shar-
ing platform can design prices to maximize social welfare
or revenue. Recall that maximizing revenue corresponds
to a short-term approach aimed at maximizing immediate
profit; whereas maximizing social welfare corresponds to a
long-term view that focuses on growing participation in the
platform rather than on immediate revenue.
Our first result characterizes the platform prices that max-
imize social welfare and revenue, respectively.
Theorem 3. The social welfare maximizing price, psw,
and the revenue maximizing price, pr, satisfy the following:
(i) The lowest market clearing price pc achieves maximal
social welfare.
(ii) The revenue-maximizing price is no less than the social
welfare maximizing price, i.e., pr ≥ pc. Thus, S(pr) ≥
D(pr).
(iii) Revenue maximization leads to better quality of service
than social welfare maximization, i.e., D(psw)
S(psw)
≥ D(pr)
S(pr)
.
There are a number of important remarks to make about
the theorem. First, note that both psw and pr ensure that
supply exceeds demand at equilibria. This is important for
the health of the platform.
Second, note that Part (i) implies that more sharing from
owners does not necessarily imply a higher social welfare.
This is perhaps counterintuitive, however, it is due to the
fact that a higher supply at a higher price can lead to more
“idle” sharing, which leads to lower utility for everyone.
Third, in Part (iii) we use D(p)
S(p)
as a measure of “quality
of service” since the experience of renters improves if there
is proportionally more aggregate supply provided by owners
via sharing. It is perhaps surprising that revenue maximiza-
tion leads to better quality of service, but it is a consequence
of the fact that revenue maximization is aligned with incen-
tives for sharing (see Theorem 2).
To investigate the relationship between the social welfare
and revenue maximizing prices in more detail, we show nu-
merical results in Figure 2. In particular, Figure 2 shows the
relationship of pr and psw under different costs and different
scarcity levels for the products. The results are shown for
quadratic f and g.5
Figure 2(a) highlights that psw and pr remain unchanged
when costs c are low, but that psw increases quickly towards
pr (eventually matching pr) as c increases.
Additionally, Figure 2(b) highlights that product scarcity
also influences psw and pr significantly. When resources be-
come scarce, psw rapidly increases towards pr. The intu-
ition for this is that when supply is insufficient, a maximum
social welfare policy also needs to guarantee the usage of
renters with high utilities, which is the same as what a max-
imum revenue policy aims to accomplish. Therefore, when
supply is abundant (Figure 2(c)), psw is much lower than
pr: a maximum social welfare policy wants to fulfill more
demand while a maximum revenue policy focuses on high
value clients.
This distinction motivates an important question about
revenue maximizing pricing: how much welfare loss does
revenue maximizing pricing incur? Our next theorem
addresses this question by providing a “price of anarchy”
bound. Recall that W (p) is defined in (7) as the aggregate
social welfare under price p. Further, we use sri to denote
the supply of owner i at pr.
Theorem 4. The social welfare gap between the maxi-
mum social welfare policy and a maximum revenue policy
is bounded by:
0 ≤ W (psw)−W (pr) (10)
5 In this simulation, we used quadratic benefit functions of
the form fi(xi) = −aix2i + bixi (same with gk(yk)) with
ai, bi > 0 for each owner, and ai, bi are uniformly chosen
from (0.1, 1.2) and (0, 1). The numbers of owners and renters
vary in different cases.
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Figure 3: An illustration of the bound tightness in
Theorem 4, with same setting used for Figure 2.
≤ pr(D(psw)−D(pr)) + prD(pr)
S(pr)
∑
i∈O:sri≥sswi
(sri − sswi ).
In particular, if sri ≥ sswi for all i ∈ O, the bounds above
become:
0 ≤W (psw)−W (pr) ≤ pr[D(psw)−D(pr)S(psw)
S(pr)
]. (11)
Moreover, the above bounds are tight.
One important feature of the efficiency loss of revenue
maximizing pricing is that it can be evaluated by third-party
organizations since it only depends on the total demand and
supply under prices pr and psw, not on private utility func-
tions of the owners and renters.
However, the form of the bound in Theorem 4 does not
lend itself to easy interpretation. A more interpretable form
can be obtained as follows:
W (psw)−W (pr)
≤ pr[D(psw)−D(pr)] + prD(pr)
S(pr)
[S(pr)− S(psw)]. (12)
The first item on the right-hand-side of (12) is an upper
bound for the utility loss of renters, since D(psw) − D(pr)
is the demand decrement from renters at pr, while pr is the
upper bound of these renters’ usage benefit. Similarly, the
second item is the upper bound of the utility loss of owners
since S(pr) − S(psw) can been seen as supply from some
new owners starting to share at pr, under risk of meeting no
renters, and pr
D(pr)
S(pr)
is the upper bound of their utility loss.
To obtain more insight about the bound, Figure 3 shows
numeric results for the case of quadratic f, g and NO = 100.
Figure 3 illustrates that, as the number of renters increases,
resource becomes scarce and the bound on the social welfare
gap decreases to zero. Thus, the revenue maximizing price
can be expected to achieve nearly maximal social welfare in
platforms where usage is high.
Another important point about the bound on the welfare
loss of revenue maximizing pricing is that the bound is tight.
In fact, we show with an example below that the upper
bound is tight for linear f, g.
Example 1 (Efficiency loss with linear benefits).
Consider linear usage benefits, i.e.,
fi(xi) =αixi, ∀i ∈ O
gk(yk) =αkyk, ∀k ∈ R (13)
Without loss of generality, suppose no users have the same
private value. We label and rank all users, including owners
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Figure 2: Comparison of the social welfare maximizing price psw and the revenue maximizing price pr under
differing costs and resource levels.
and renters, by their private values:
α1 > α2 > ... > αNR+NO . (14)
Note that linear utility are a common case of interest in
network economics, see [3].
In this case, owner i’s best response is to choose either to
share his product all the time (si = 1) or to use his prod-
uct all the time (xi = 1), depending on whether his or her
private value αi is lower or higher than the market price.
Similarly, renter k will choose to request either full use of
a product (yk = 1) or zero demand (yk = 0), depending on
his or her private value αk.
We can find that the maximum social welfare price is set
such that users (including owners and renters) of the first
NO highest αi get full use of the products (xi = 1).
This is the best possible arrangement for maximizing so-
cial welfare, since all users with higher private values get
access to products. In this case, demand equals supply and
no product is wasted, e.g., no cars are running empty.
Now, we can evaluate the performance of the bound in
Theorem 4. Consider the concrete example shown in Table
1, where NR = NO = 3.
Ranking of private value Owner’s αi Renter’s αk
1 5 4 + δ > 4
2 2 1.5
3 1 0.5
Table 1: Tightness of Theorem 4 for Example 1.
Let c = 0.01. From the above reasoning, psw ∈ (1.5, 2),
which lets renter r1 use owner o3’s product and owner o1, o2
use their own products. The transaction volume is 1 · psw ∈
(1.5, 2) and the social welfare is 11 + δ − 3c. In contrast,
pr = 4 + δ/2, and is such that only renter r1 can rent a
product and owners o2, o3 share their products all the time.
The trade volume is 4+δ/2 and the social welfare is 9+δ−3c.
Thus, the social welfare gap between these two policies is
W (psw) −W (pr) = 2, and the bound given by Theorem 4
is W (psw) −W (pr) ≤ pr[D(psw) − D(pr)S(psw)S(pr) ] = 2 + δ4 .
Since δ can be arbitrarily small, the bound is tight.
4. SUBSIDIZING SHARING
One may expect that many practical sharing platforms
operate in a “underprovisioned” or “congested” regime where
more people will be interested in using the platform to rent
than to share. This is especially true when sharing platforms
are getting started. To handle such situations, most sharing
platforms provide subsidies to encourage owners to share,
thus increasing supply [19]. These subsidies are crucial to
growing supply in order to match demand and our goal in
this section is to investigate how a sharing platform can
optimize such subsidies.
To begin, recall an important observation from the pre-
vious section contrasting social welfare maximization and
revenue maximization: the two pricing strategies align in
situations where the platform is “underprovisioned” or “con-
gested”, i.e., situations where the number of renters is large
compared to the number of owners, e.g., see Figure 2(b).
This observation provides a motivation for the use of sub-
sidies: they align because they both use the minimal pos-
sible market clearing price, psw = pr = pc, which ensures
S(pc) = D(pc). In such situations, larger supply would al-
low the price to be lower and more demand to be served –
yielding (potentially) higher revenue and/or social welfare.
The results in this section characterize the potential im-
provements from subsidization and identify when subsidies
can be valuable.
To begin, define function V (p) , p ·D(p) and let ppotential
denote the price which maximizes V (p) over p ∈ [0, pupper].
Thus, V (ppotential) is the potential maximum revenue that
the platform can obtain if supply is sufficient. However,
it may not possible to achieve this as S(ppotential) can be
smaller than D(ppotential).
Our first theorem highlights that it is not possible to
achieve the maximal potential revenue without subsidiza-
tion if ppotential is lower than the welfare maximizing price.
In this case, the revenue maximizing price aligns with the
social welfare maximizing price because dropping below that
point would lead to a supply shortage and revenue reduction.
Theorem 5. When ppotential ≥ pc, the platform can ex-
tract maximum potential revenue by setting pr = ppotential.
Otherwise, pr = psw = pc.
The behavior described by Theorem 5 can be observed in
Figure 4, where the red dotted line shows that ppotential = 12
maximizes function V = pD(p). Without subsidy, plat-
form’s revenue maximization policy is to set pr = pc =
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Figure 4: Without subsidy, the platform achieves
maximum revenue at pr = 13 (green line), due to the
fact that at ppotential = 12, there is not enough supply.
With subsidy  = 0.5, platform can now use ppotential
to extract maximum potential revenue (red line).
13 (the green dotted line), since supply is not sufficient at
ppotential. However, if the platform subsidizes owners to
boost supply such that supply is higher than demand at
ppotential, than platform can obtain maximum V (ppotential).
Figure 4 highlights the potential gains from subsidization,
but the key question when determining subsidies is if the
benefit from subsidization exceeds the cost of the subsidies
themselves. To understand this, we quantify how much ad-
ditional supply can be obtained by subsidies below.
Specifically, we assume that sharing platform provides an
additional subsidy for sharing of p,  > 0 per unit sharing.
Thus, the effective price seen by an owner becomes p·(D(p)
S(p)
+
).6 Therefore, an owner’s utility function becomes:
U i (xi, si) = fi(xi) + p(min{D(p)
S(p)
, 1}+ )si − cxi − csi.
Our next theorems characterize the supply S(p) under
subsidy factor  > 0, compared to the original S(p) ( =
0). The first result highlights that subsidization necessarily
increases aggregate supply.
Theorem 6. For any 2 > 1 ≥ 0, we have S2(p) ≥
S1(p). In particular, S(p) ≥ S0(p), where S0(p) is the
original supply with  = 0.
The second result highlights that there are three regimes
for subsidization, of which the first is the most relevant for
practical situations.
Theorem 7. The impact of subsidization can be catego-
rized into three regimes:
1. Small subsidies: For  such that  ≤ D(p)
S0(p)
(1− s0i
S0(p)
),∀i ∈
O, we have
S(p) ≤ F () = D(p) +
√
M2 + 4D(p)s0i 
2[ D(p)
S0(p)
(1− s0i
S0(p)
)− ]
, (15)
where M = D(p)(1− 2s0i
S0(p)
). Also, F (0) = S0(p).
6Note that this model also applies to the case of enthusiastic
users who have an optimistic perception about the fraction
of time they will receive customers.
2. Medium subsidies: For  such that D(p)
S0(p)
(1− s0i
S0(p)
) <
 < 1
p
(∂+fi(0)− pD(p)S

−i
(S−i+1)2
), we have that xi(p)+s

i(p) =
1 and si < 1 for all i ∈ O.
3. Large subsidies: For  such that  ≥ 1
p
(∂+fi(0) −
pD(p)S−i
(S−i+1)2
), for all i ∈ O, we have that si = 1, i.e.,
S(p) = NO.
The above theorems together highlight that subsidies nec-
essarily increase the sharing supply from product owners.
Without subsidy, when there is a supply shortage at ppotential,
the platform’s maximum revenue policy is to set price to pc.
However, if the platform chooses a proper subsidy  and a
price p then it can achieve improved revenue. The following
theorem characterizes when this is possible.
Theorem 8. There exists a subsidy  that increases rev-
enue whenever
V (p) = p min{D(p), S(p)} − S(p) ≥ pcD(pc).
Note that Theorem 8 also shows that an appropriate sub-
sidy  can be found by optimizing V (p). Concretely, Figure
4 shows that by introducing  = 0.5, the platform can close
the supply gap at ppotential = 12 by shifting the market
clearing price from pc = 13 to ppotential = 12.
Beyond the example in Figure 4, we also derive the im-
pact of subsidies analytically under quadratic usage benefits
in the following example, showing substantial increase in
revenue.
Example 2 (Subsidies for quadratic usage benefits).
Suppose there are NO = 100 owners and NR = 150 renters
in the platform. Let all renters’ utility functions be gk(yk) =
3yk − y2k, all owners’ utility functions be fi(xi) = 4xi − x2i
and c = 0. In this case, total demand is given by D(p) =
NR · (3 − p)/2 = 225 − 75p by solving (3). Optimizing
V (p) = pD(p) gives ppotential = 1.5.
To derive the market clearing price pc, we first calculate
each owner’s supply at pc:
s∗i (pc) = arg max
si
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) + pcsi = (
pc − 2
2
)+
Here we have used si + xi = 1 at pc since c = 0. This gives
S(pc) =
∑
i∈O s
∗
i (pc) = NO · (pc − 2)/2 = 50pc − 100. By
solving the following equation
D(pc) = S(pc)
we have pc = 2.6, which gives D(pc) = S(pc) = 30. From
the above, we see that at ppotential = 1.5, S(ppotential) =
0 < D(ppotential) = 112.5. By Theorem 3 and Theorem 5,
we have that pc = pr = psw = 2.6 and platform’s revenue is
V0 = pcD(pc) = 78.
Now, consider providing a subsidy . Denote pc as the
market clearing price under subsidy . We have D(p) =
225 − 75p and S(p) = 50(p + ) − 100 for all p ≤ pc. By
solving D(pc) = S(p

c) we have:
pc = (13− 2)/5. (16)
Now consider the case when the platform use p = pc,
so that the platform can avoid over-subsidizing owners when
supply is higher than demand. Hence, the net revenue is
given by:
max

V  = (pc − )S(pc)
Plugging (16) into the above objective we can find that the
optimal subsidy will be  = 3
7
.
In this case, we show that by setting subsidy  = 3
7
, pr =
pc = 2.43. In which case we have S
(pr) = D(p

r) = 42.75,
and the transaction volume is pD(p) = 103.9 and the plat-
form obtains a higher net revenue V  = 85 > V0.
5. CASE STUDY: DIDI CHUXING
We consider the case of ridesharing in this section in order
to ground the analytic work described above. We have ob-
tained a dataset from Didi Chuxing, the largest ride-sharing
platform in China – Didi Chuxing sees 10 million daily rides
[22]. The dataset we have obtained includes transaction
records for the first three weeks of January 2016, in a Chi-
nese city. Each record consists of driver ID, passenger ID,
starting district ID, destination district ID, and fee for a
ride. For the experiments described below we use data from
Jan 8th, which includes 395, 938 transaction records, though
results are consistent for other days.
5.1 Experimental setup
In order to fit our model to the data, we use the number of
transactions at different prices to represent renters’ demands
under different prices. This allows us to fit an aggregate
demand curve. We use an exponential function of the form
D(p) = αe−βp, where α = 19190, β = 0.0832. This achieves
an r2 value of 0.9991. The fit is illustrated in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Transaction volume from Didi data.
The exponential form for the aggregate demand curve cor-
responds to each renter’s gk(yk) having following form:
gk(yk) =
1
β
(yk + yk log(
α
NR
)− yk log yk). (17)
We also assume that product owners have the same form
for their usage benefit. Finally, since DiDi has a minimum
charge on each ride (at 10 RMB), we reset the zero price
point to the minimum charge fee.
5.2 Experimental results
Using the dataset from Didi, we study the distinction be-
tween social welfare and revenue maximizing prices, the im-
pact of cost, and the role of subsidies in practical settings.
Welfare loss. The first question we ask is “how do social
welfare maximizing prices and revenue maximizing prices
differ in practical situations?” To answer this question, we
examine settings when supply is less than demand, i.e., from
NO = 100 to 1100 while NR = 1919. These “congested”
scenarios align with the load experienced by Didi.
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mand, supply is in shortage and hence pr = psw.
The results are summarized in Figure 7, which highlights
that, when supply is not abundant, the platform actually
achieves maximum social welfare and maximum revenue si-
multaneously when it sets the price to maximize revenue.
Note that, given the parameterized model of demand, we
can calculate the price that produces the maximum poten-
tial revenue: ppotential = argmax{p} pD(p) = 12.
The alignment of revenue and welfare in Figure 7 is con-
sistent with the results in Theorem 5: since pc = psw >
ppotential due to insufficient supply, the revenue maximizing
price will be pr = psw.
The role of cost. Next, we investigate how costs impact
platform prices and outcomes. Recall that the cost c cor-
responds to the maintenance costs for the product. Impor-
tantly, it also captures any supply-side regulation through
taxation on usage, e.g., a gas tax. The results are summa-
rized in Figure 5(a) (NO = 100, NR = 191), which shows the
demand and supply under different costs, and Figure 5(b)
(NO = 100, NR = 300), which shows the results based on
quadratic usage benefit function for comparison.
In these two figures, we observe that the cost c is an impor-
tant factor in determining the lowest price to enable sharing,
i.e., there will be no sharing at p < c. More importantly,
the figures highlight that higher costs significantly suppress
sharing. This is intuitive, as drivers choose their sharing
level more conservatively if they have to pay more mainte-
nance costs during the times when they are sharing. This
highlights that a properly chosen cost c can help reduce re-
dundant supply while maintaining an acceptable QoS. This
is crucial to many social issues such as greenhouse gas emis-
sion, road congestion, and it is implementable through, e.g.,
gas taxes.
Another result that is highlighted in Figure 5(b) is that,
when c is not high enough, the market clearing price pc re-
mains the same. This implies that the platform’s revenue
does not change with costs when cost is at low-to-moderate
levels. That is to say, if usage taxes are used to regulate a
platform, product owners will incur this cost and the plat-
form’s revenue is likely to not be impacted.
The Role of Subsidies. Finally, we investigate the im-
pact of subsidies in practical settings. Figure 7 highlights
that pr differs from the price that optimizes the potential
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Figure 5: Role of cost and subsidies.
revenue ppotential. This is because the platform does not at-
tract enough sharing. Hence, the platform can not extract
the maximum potential revenue since pr = pc > ppotential in
this case. As illustrated in Section 4, subsidizing owners for
sharing is beneficial in such situations. Figure 5(c) shows
the impact of subsidizing owners in the Didi data set, with
NR = 1919, NO = 1100. In this case, only a small subsidy
( = 0.1) is needed to steer the price toward ppotential = 12.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we study the design of prices and subsidies
within sharing platforms. We extend traditional models of
two-sided markets to include the opportunity for a tradeoff
between using a resource directly or sharing it through a
platform. This extension adds considerable technical com-
plexity. However, we are able to prove that a unique equi-
librium exists regardless of the prices imposed by the shar-
ing platform. Further, we provide results characterizing the
revenue maximizing price and the social welfare maximizing
price. These results allow us to bound the efficiency loss
under revenue maximizing pricing. Additionally, these re-
sults highlight that the revenue maximizing price may be
constrained due to supply shortages, and so subsidies for
sharing are crucial in order to reach the maximal potential
revenue. Finally, we provide results that allow optimization
of the size of the subsidy to maximize the tradeoff between
increased revenue and the cost of the subsidies themselves.
Our results are grounded by an exploration of data from
Didi, the largest ridesharing platform in China.
The results in this paper provide interesting insights about
prices and subsidies in sharing platforms, but they also leave
many questions unanswered. For example, we have consid-
ered a static pricing setting, and dynamic pricing is common
in sharing platforms. Recent work has made some progress
in understanding dynamic pricing in the context of rideshar-
ing, but looking at dynamic pricing more generally in two-
sided sharing platforms remains a difficult open problem.
Additionally, our work separates pricing from matching in
the sharing platform. We do not model how matches are per-
formed, we only assume that they are “fair” in the long-run.
Incorporating constraints on matching, and understanding
how these impact prices, is a challenging and important di-
rection for future work.
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8. APPENDIX
8.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium first,
and then prove the characterization of supply and demand
in four regimes of p.
Proof of Existence
Let S = (s1, s2, ...sNo), with si being owner i’s share level,
and X = (x1, x2..., xNO+NR), with xi being owner i’s self-
usage level.
First we notice that an owner i’s strategy space is (xi, si) ∈
{xi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0, xi + si ≤ 1} and a renter’s action space is
yk ∈ [0, 1], both of which are compact convex sets. The to-
tal demand D(p) is fixed as long as p is set, since renters’
demand only depend on their utilities and the market price.
Also note that the game only involves owners, i.e., consider
equation (5). Since the total supply S(p) =
∑
i si, owner i’s
utility function is continuous in {s1, s2, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sNO}
and X.
Depending onD(p) and others owners’ total supply
∑
j 6=i sj ,
there are three cases:
• D(p) < ∑j 6=i sj : the utility function for i becomes
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) + p
D(p)
S(p)
si − cxi − csi and we know
that pD(p)
S(p)
si = p
D(p)∑
j 6=i sj+si
si is concave in si.
• D(p) >∑j 6=i sj + 1: the utility function for i becomes
Ui(xi) = fi(xi) + psi − cxi − csi, which is also concave
in si.
• ∑j 6=i sj < D(p) <∑j 6=i sj + 1, the utility function for
i becomes
Ui(xi, si) =
{
fi(xi) + p
D(p)
S(p)
si − cxi − csi if D(p) ≤ S(p)
fi(xi) + psi − cxi − csi else
This function is continuous. It is concave in si since (a)
each piece is concave in si and (b) at the intersection
point of these two pieces, the left derivative p − c is
greater than the right derivative pD(p)(S(p)−si)
S(p)2
− c =
pS(p)−si
S(p)
− c.
Hence, owner i’s utility function in all three cases above is
continuous and concave to its own strategy (xi, si).
According to [16], [9], and [13], a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium exists since each user’s strategy space is convex and
compact, and the utility function of each user is concave in
his strategy, and continuous in S and X.
Proof of Characterization
Before proving the characterization of supply and demand,
we first introduce the proposition below, which will be proven
in following section.
Proposition 1. The total demand D(p) is continuous
and non-increasing in the market price p and eventually
reaches 0 when p is high enough, i.e., p ≥ B where B is
the upper bound of the right derivative of gk(·) at yk = 0.
By Proposition 1, the total demand decreases to 0 when
market price exceeds B. Note that pupperD(pupper) = c.
(a) We first show by contradiction that there exists a point
p such that D(p) ≤ S(p) in [0, pupper). Suppose there is no
cross point between D(p) and S(p), then we have S(p) <
D(p) for all p ∈ [0, pupper).
Since each owner’s benefit function is strictly concave and
its derivative at 0 bounded by pupper, we can always find
some pδ = pupper − δ, where δ > 0 can be infinitely small,
such that S(pδ) > 0. Then, owner i’s overall utility is given
by:
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) + pδsi − cxi − csi, (18)
Note that in (18), as we inrease pδ towards pupper, owners
will not lower their supply, i.e., S(p) is non-decreasing in
[0, pupper] and S(p) ≥ S(pδ) > 0 in [pδ, pupper). On the
other hand, D(p) continuously decreases to 0 as p goes to
pupper. These two properties guarantee an intersection of
D(p) and S(p) and lead to a contradiction.
(b) We now show Part (ii), i.e., there exists p′ < pupper
such that D(p′) = S(p′). Thus, pc = p′ here.
Since S(p) is eventually larger than D(p), there must exist
some price p′ such that D(p′−) > S(p
′
−) for p
′
− = p
′ − δ and
D(p+) < S(p+) for p
′
+ = p
′ + δ, here δ → 0+ is a positive
infinitesimal. We only need to show that D(p′) = S(p′), i.e.,
S(p) is continuous at the intersection point p′.
Suppose the opposite that S(p′+)−S(p′−) = ∆ > 0, where
∆ is some positive constant. Then, there must exists some
owner i, such that s∗i (p
′
+) − s∗i (p′−) = ∆i > 0, and the
effective price at p′+ is
p′+D(p
′
+)
S(p′+)+∆
. Let x+i , s
+
i and x
−
i , s
−
i
denote owner i’s strategy at prices p′+ and p
′
− in equilibrium,
respectively, and denote S+−i =
∑
j∈O,j 6=i s
+
j . SinceD(p+) <
S(p+), we have:
fi(x
+
i ) +
p′+D(p
′
+)
S+−i + s
+
i
s+i − cx+i − cs+i
≥ fi(x−i ) + p′+ min{
D(p′+)
S+−i + s
−
i
, 1}s−i − cx−i − cs−i
and that
fi(x
−
i ) + p
′
−s
−
i − cx−i − cs−i ≥ fi(x+i ) + p′−s+i − cx+i − cs+i
Summing up two equations above, we have:
(
p′+D(p
′
+)
S+−i + s
+
i
− p′−)s+i ≥ (p′+ min{
D(p′+)
S+−i + s
−
i
, 1}− p′−)s−i (19)
Since S+−i + s
+
i = S
+ > D+, we have
p′+D(p
′
+)
S+−i+s
+
i
− p′− < 0 by
having a small δ. Now consider the right hand side, there
are two cases.
• If D(p
′
+)
S+−i+s
−
i
≥ 1, (19) becomes ( p
′
+D(p
′
+)
S+−i+s
+
i
− p′−)s+i ≥ 0,
which means s+i ≤ 0 and gives a contradiction.
• If D(p
′
+)
S+−i+s
−
i
< 1, we have:
s+i ≤
p′+D(p
′
+)
S+−i+s
−
i
− p′−
D(p′+)
S+−i+s
+
i
− p′−
s−i ≤ s−i ,
which also gives a contradiction.
(c) Now we show Part (iii), i.e., D(p) ≤ S(p) for p ≥ p′.
Recall that when p = p′,
Ui(xi) = fi(xi) + p
′si − cxi − csi, (20)
and the best response is denoted by (x∗i (p
′), s∗i (p
′)). Assume
the contradiction that for some p1 > p
′ we have D(p1) >
S(p1). Then, owner i’s utility function at p1 becomes:
Ui(xi) = fi(xi) + p1si − cxi − csi, (21)
where the best response is (x∗i (p1), s
∗
i (p1)). Compare equa-
tion (20) and (21), we have:
fi(x
∗
i (p
′)) + p′s∗i (p
′)− cs∗i (p′)− cx∗i (p′)
≥fi(x∗i (p1)) + p′s∗i (p1)− cs∗i (p1)− cx∗i (p1) (22)
and
fi(x
∗
i (p1)) + p1s
∗
i (p1)− cs∗i (p1)− cx∗i (p1)
≥fi(x∗i (p′)) + p1s∗i (p′)− cs∗i (p′)− cx∗i (p′) (23)
Summing (22) and (23), we have:
p1(s
∗
i (p1)− s∗i (p′)) ≥ p′(s∗i (p1)− s∗i (p′)). (24)
Since p1 > p
′ > 0, we have:
s∗i (p1)− s∗i (p′) ≥ 0. (25)
Since i is arbitrary, we have S(p1) ≥ S(p′), and S(p1) ≥
S(p′) = D(p′) ≥ D(p1) by Proposition 1, which leads to a
contradiction.
(d) Now consider Part (i). From the above, if we let pc
be the smallest market clearing price, pc = min{p′ |D(p′) =
S(p′)}, we have S(p) ≥ D(p), ∀p ≥ pc. The nondecreasing
property of S(p) for p ≤ p′ can be shown as follows. Since
D(p) ≤ S(p) for p ≤ p′, the utility function for each owner i
is given by:
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) + psi − cxi − csi.
Thus, each one’s si is nondecreasing when p increases.
(e) Finally, Part (iv) follows since at price pupper, the
market is not profitable, i.e., pupper min{D(pupper)S(pupper , 1}) ≤
pupperD(pupper) = c. Thus, si = 0 for all i.
Proof of Uniqueness
We prove uniqueness of Nash equilibrium here, given that
f(·) is differentiable.
First, if p < pc, then S(p) < D(p). In this case each
owner is doing optimization independently by solving fol-
lowing utility maximization problem:
max
xi,si
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) + psi − cxi − csi
s.t. xi ≥ 0, si ≥ 0, si + xi ≤ 1.
Thus, the solution is unique for everyone due to the strict
concavity of utility functions.
Now consider p ≥ pc. We prove the result by contradic-
tion. Suppose there exist more than one equilibrium state.
Denote Ω(p) = {ω(p) = (x∗(p), s∗(p))} the set of Nash equi-
libria of the system given p. We first introduce the following
lemma before proving uniqueness:
Lemma 1. Let Λ = {p|D(p) = S(p), p ∈ [pc, pupper]} de-
note the set of prices in [pc, pupper] such that demand equals
supply in, we have following results.
(a) When p /∈ Λ and market reaches Nash equilibrium, we
must have:
∂+fi(x
∗
i (p)) ≤ dQi(si; p)
dsi
∣∣∣∣
s∗i
≤ ∂−fi(x∗i (p)) (26)
for any owner i such that 0 < x∗i (p), s
∗
i (p) < 1, where
Qi(si; p) = p
D(p)
S(p)
si. If s
∗
i (p) = 0, the second inequality of
(26) holds (the first holds if x∗i (p) = 0). If fi(xi) is differ-
entiable, dfi(xi)
dxi
∣∣∣∣
x∗i
= dQi(si;p)
dsi
∣∣∣∣
s∗i
.
(b) When p ∈ Λ, the second inequality of (26) holds and
we have:
p ≥ ∂+fi(x∗i (p)) (27)
Lemma 1 shows that when fi(xi) is differentiable, the
derivative of fi(x
∗
i ) equals derivative of Qi(s
∗
i , p) when s
∗
i <
1, and the derivative of fi(x
∗
i ) is less than derivative of
Qi(s
∗
i , p) when s
∗
i = 1. There are three situations:
1. ∀ωk ∈ Ω, we have Sωk (p) = Dωk (p). This is impossible
due to the similar reason as showed above in the case
when p < pc. In this case each owner is doing concave
optimization independently and thus yields only one
solution.
2. ∃ωk ∈ Ω such that Sωk (p) = Dωk (p), and ∃ωj ∈ Ω such
that Sωj (p) > Dωj (p). We have Sωj (p) > Sωk (p) and
there must exists some i such that s
ωj
i (p) > s
ωk
i (p). In
this case, we have by Part (a) of Lemma 1 that
p >
pD(p)S
ωj
−i
(Sωj )2
=
dQi(si; p)
ωj
dsi
∣∣∣∣
s
ωj
i
=
dfi(xi)
dxi
∣∣∣∣
x
ωj
i
≥dfi(xi)
dxi
∣∣∣∣
x
ωk
i
=p
Here the second inequality is due to the fact that x
ωj
i ≤
x
ωk
i . For otherwise x
ωj
i > x
ωk
i and s
ωj
i (p) > s
ωk
i (p).
Then, at equilibrium ωk, user i should have used the
larger x
ωj
i (this is possible since x
ωk
i + s
ωj
i < 1). This
yields contradiction.
3. ∀ωk ∈ Ω, we have Sωk (p) > Dωk (p). In this case, all
owners’ utility functions are given by:
Ui(xi, si) = fi(xi) +
D(p)
S(p)
si − cxi − csi.
Let zi = [xi, si]
Tdenote action vector of i, and z =
[z1, ..., zNO ]
T . Note that z ∈ A, where the action space
A = {(x, s)|x, s ≥ 0, x+ s ≤ 1}, i.e., and A is a convex
compact set. Denote
h(z) = [∇1Ui(x1, s1), ...,∇NOUi(xNO , sNO )]T ,
where ∇iUi(xi, si) = [ ∂Ui(xi,si)∂xi
∂Ui(xi,si)
∂si
]T is the gra-
dient of Ui(xi, si) with respect to zi at z. Below we
prove that
∑
i∈O Ui(zi) is diagonal strictly concave [30]
for any z¯, z∗ ∈ A. Then, by [30], the Nash equilibrium
is unique. To this end, we have:
(z¯− z∗)T (h(z∗)− h(z¯))
=
∑
i∈O
(x¯i − x∗i )(f ′(x∗i )− f ′(x¯i))
+ pD(p)
∑
i∈O
(s¯i − s∗i )
(
S∗−i(p)
(S∗(p))2
− S¯−i(p)
(S¯(p))2
)
>pD(p)
∑
i∈O
(s¯i − s∗i )
(
S∗−i(p)
(S∗(p))2
− S¯−i(p)
(S¯(p))2
)
=pD(p)
∑
i∈O
(s¯i − s∗i )( 1
S∗
− 1
S¯
− s
∗
i
(S∗)2
+
s¯i
(S¯)2
)
=pD(p)
(S¯ − S∗)2
S∗S¯
+ pD(p)
∑
i∈O
(s¯i − s∗i )( s¯i
(S¯)2
− s
∗
i
(S∗)2
)
=pD(p)
(S¯ − S∗)2
S∗S¯
+ pD(p)
∑
i∈O
[(
s¯i
S¯
− s
∗
i
S∗
)2 +
2s¯is
∗
i
S¯S∗
− s¯is
∗
i
(S¯)2
− s¯is
∗
i
(S∗)2
]
=pD(p)[
(S¯ − S∗)2
S∗S¯
+ (
∑
i∈O
(
s¯i
S¯
− s
∗
i
S∗
)2 − s¯is
∗
i
(S¯S∗)2
(S¯ − S∗)2)]
=pD(p)[
∑
i∈O
(
s¯i
S¯
− s
∗
i
S∗
)2 +
(S¯ − S∗)2
S∗S¯
(1−
∑
i∈O
s¯is
∗
i
S¯S∗
)]
≥pD(p)[
∑
i∈O
(
s¯i
S¯
− s
∗
i
S∗
)2 +
(S¯ − S∗)2
S∗S¯
(1−
∑
i∈O
s¯i
S¯
)]
>0.
The second to last inequality is due to the fact that
s∗i /S
∗ ≤ 1. We have then by [30] that the equilibrium
is unique.
From the three cases above, we conclude the uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium.
8.2 Proof of Lemma 1
For simplicity of representation, we ignore parameter p in
function Qi(si; p) since p is fixed.
We first prove Part (a), i.e., consider p /∈ Λ. Note that in
this case D(p) < S(p).
(i) We look at the left inequality of equation (26). Suppose
instead
dQi(s
∗
i )
dsi
< ∂+fi(x
∗
i ). For 0 < s
∗
i (p) ≤ 1, we have:
lim
δ→0+
Ui(x
∗
i + δ, s
∗
i − δ)− Ui(x∗i , s∗i )
= lim
δ→0+
fi(x
∗
i + δ)− fi(x∗i ) +Qi(s∗i − δ)−Qi(s∗i )
= lim
δ→0+
(∂+fi(x
∗
i )− dQi(s
∗
i )
dsi
)δ
≥ 0.
Thus, decreasing supply by an infinitesimal δ leads to a
higher utility, which gives a contradiction. Note that analy-
sis in this step allows x∗i = 0.
(ii) Now we turn to the right inequality of (26). Similarly
suppose
dQi(s
∗
i )
dsi
> ∂−fi(x∗i ) for p ≥ pc and 0 < x∗i (p) ≤ 1.
We have a similar proof:
lim
δ→0+
Ui(x
∗
i − δ, s∗i + δ)− Ui(x∗i , s∗i )
= lim
δ→0+
fi(x
∗
i − δ)− fi(x∗i ) +Qi(s∗i + δ)−Qi(s∗i )
= lim
δ→0+
(−∂−fi(x∗i ) + dQi(s
∗
i )
dsi
)δ
≥ 0.
This also gives a contradiction. Note that analysis in this
step allows s∗i = 0.
(iii) When fi(xi) is differentiable, the analysis still applies.
(b) Now we consider p ∈ Λ. Note that D(p) = S(p) in
this case. In this case, the proof of second inequality of (26)
is the same as case (ii) above. This is so because although
D(p) = S(p), when consider increasing s∗i by a small δ.
As for inequality (27), suppose
dQi(s
∗
i )
dsi
< ∂+fi(x
∗
i ). Note
that Qi(s
∗
i ; p) = pc
D(p)
S(p)
= p. For 0 < s∗i (p) ≤ 1, we have:
lim
δ→0+
Ui(x
∗
i + δ, s
∗
i − δ)− Ui(x∗i , s∗i )
= lim
δ→0+
fi(x
∗
i + δ)− fi(x∗i ) + p(s∗i − δ)−Qi(s∗i )
= lim
δ→0+
(∂+fi(x
∗
i )− p)δ
≥ 0,
which gives a contradiction.
Combining (a) and (b) we have the lemma.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Under the concavity and continuity assumption
of gk, a renter has continuous optimal demand y
∗
k(p) ∈ [0, 1]
which maximizes his overall utility Uk(yk) given by (2).
Suppose the market price is p0, we must have:
Up0k (y
∗
k(p0))− Up0k (y′k)
=gk(y
∗
k(p0))− p0y∗k(p0)− gk(y′k) + p0y′k
≥0, ∀k′i ∈ [0, 1]
That is,
gk(y
∗
k(p0))− gk(y′k)) ≥ p0(y∗k(p0)− y′k), ∀y′k ∈ [0, 1]
Hence, when price is p1 such that p1 > p0, for any y
′
k >
y∗k(p0), we must have:
Up1k (y
∗
k(p0))− Up1i (y′k)
=gk(y
∗
k(p0))− p1y∗k(p0)− gk(y′k) + p1y′k
≥(p0 − p1)(y∗k(p0)− y′k)
>0
Here the first inequality follows from the above equation.
This implies y∗k(p1) ≤ y∗k(p0), i.e., each renter’s demand is
non-increasing in p.
For any renter k, we have gk(yk) < Byk, yk ∈ [0, 1] since
derivative of gk(yk) is bounded by B. Then, every renter
has zero demand when p ≥ B.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Denote owner i’s strategy at the market equilibrium under
price p as x∗i (p), s
∗
i (p). Before proving Theorem 2, we intro-
duce the following lemmas (here ∂+fi(x
∗
i (p)), ∂−fi(x
∗
i (p))
denote the right and left derivatives of fi(xi) at x
∗
i , which
always exist since fi(xi) is concave).
Lemma 2. When p ∈ [pc, pupper] and S(p) > 0, there
exist at least two i ∈ O such that si > 0.
Lemma 3. When c < p ≤ pc, we have x∗i (p) + s∗i (p) = 1
for all i ∈ O.
Lemma 4. Given price p > pc, for any i such that s
∗
i (p) >
s∗i (pc), we have x
∗
i (p) + s
∗
i (p) = 1 and x
∗
i (p) < x
∗
i (pc).
We prove the theorem by contradiction. Let p1, p2 > pc
be such that p1D(p1) ≥ p2(D(p2) and D(p1) < S(p1) and
D(p2) < S(p2). Suppose that S(p1) < S(p2).
LetK denote the set of owners such that s∗i (p1) < s∗i (p2) ≤
1 for all i ∈ K, i.e., K = {i|s∗i (p1) < s∗i (p2)}. Since S(p1) <
S(p2), K 6= ∅. Since fi(xi) is concave, we know that for
i ∈ K, x∗i (p1) ≥ x∗i (p2) (otherwise owner i can increase
x∗i (p1) to x
∗
i (p2)).
(a) We first consider the case when x∗i (p1) > x
∗
i (p2), ∀i ∈
K. We consider the following cases.
1. If there exists some i ∈ K such that S−i(p1) ≥ S−i(p2).
Then, we have for i that:
dQi(s
∗
i (p1); p1)
dsi
=
p1D(p1)S−i(p1)
(S−i(p1) + s∗i (p1))2
>
p2D(p2)S−i(p2)
(S−i(p2) + s∗i (p2))2
≥ ∂+fi(x∗i (p2))
≥∂−fi(x∗i (p1)).
Here the first inequality is obtained by the condition in
this step that S−i(p1) ≥ S−i(p2) and the assumption
that S−i(p1) + s∗i (p1) = S(p1) < S(p2) = S−i(p2) +
s∗i (p2). From Lemma 1 we know that x
∗
i (p1), s
∗
i (p1)
will not be an equilibrium strategy, contradiction.
2. If no i satisfies the condition in step 1, we have S−i(p1) <
S−i(p2), ∀i ∈ K. We now consider if there exists i ∈ K
satisfies S−i(p1) ≥ s∗i (p1), i.e., s∗i is smaller than oth-
ers’ sharing at p1. For such an owner i, we have:
dQi(s
∗
i (p1); p1)
dsi
=
p1D(p1)S−i(p1)
(S−i(p1) + s∗i (p1))2
>
p2D(p2)S−i(p2)
(S−i(p2) + s∗i (p1))2
>
p2D(p2)S−i(p2)
(S−i(p2) + s∗i (p2))2
≥∂+fi(x∗i (p2)) ≥ ∂−fi(x∗i (p1)).
Here the first inequality is given by the fact that func-
tion q(x) = x
(x+k)2
is monotone decreasing in x ≥ k
and p1D(p1) ≥ p2D(p2), and the second inequality is
from the definition of K.
3. If no i satisfied any conditions in above two steps, i.e.,
S−i(p1) < S−i(p2) and S−i(p1) < s∗i (p1) for all i ∈ K.
Note that S−i(p1) < s∗i (p1) implies there exists at most
one i in K in this case. Since K 6= ∅, there is exactly
one i′ ∈ K. By the definition of K, we have s∗j (p1) >
s∗j (p2), ∀j 6= i. However, we have S−i(p1) < S−i(p2),
which gives a contradiction.
(b) Now we consider the case when there exists i ∈ K such
that x∗i (p1) = x
∗
i (p2). For such an i, we have:
∂+fi(x
∗
i (p1)) ≤ c = dQi(s
∗
i (p1); p1)
dsi
≤ ∂−fi(x∗i (p1)). (28)
The first inequality is due to the fact that x∗i (p1) + s
∗
i (p1) <
x∗i (p1) + s
∗
i (p2) ≤ 1 so that the partial derivative of fi is no
more than the cost, whereas the second inequality is due to
Lemma 1 and that s∗i (p1) < s
∗
i (p2) ≤ 1.
We can adopt the same argument as above to obtain:
dQi(s
∗
i (p1); p1)
dsi
=
prD(p1)S−i(p1)
(S−i(p1) + s∗i (p1))2
>
p2D(p2)S−i(p2)
(S−i(p2) + s∗i (p2))2
.
Note that the last term is exactly
dQi(s
∗
i (p2);p2)
dsi
, which sat-
isfies
dQi(s
∗
i (p2);p2)
dsi
≥ c. Combining this with the above, we
have:
dQi(s
∗
i (p1); p1)
dsi
> c,
which contradicts with (28).
Combining (a) and (b) we have S(p1) ≥ S(p2).
8.5 Proof of Lemma2
Suppose there exists only one owner i such that si > 0.
Since p ≥ pc, we have S(p) ≥ D(p) by Proposition 1. Mean-
while, we must have si ≤ D(p) given utility in equation (5)
since S(p) = si. Thus, we have D(p) = S(p) = si. Then
consider two cases,
(i) If p < po, we have D(p) > 1, since D(p) = si ≤ 1,
contradiction.
(ii) If p ≥ po, for any j such that sj = 0, according to
Lemma 1, we have: po > ∂−fj(1) ≥ dQj(sj ;p)dsj
∣∣∣∣
s∗j=0
= po,
where the first inequality is due to Assumption 2. This gives
a contradiction.
8.6 Proof of Lemma 3
(a) If c < p < pc, we have x
∗
i (p) + s
∗
i (p) = 1 for all i ∈ O.
Otherwise suppose for some i such that x∗i (p) + s
∗
i (p) < 1.
Then, we will have
lim
δ→0+
Ui(x
∗
i (p), s
∗
i (p) + δ)− Ui(x∗i (p), s∗i (p))
= lim
δ→0+
(p− c)δ
≥0,
which is a contradiction.
(b)If p = pc. Let x
δ
i , s
δ
i denote i’s strategy at equilibrium
at pδ = pc−δ > c. From above analysis, we have xδi +sδi = 1.
Consider some strategy (x∆i , s
∆
i ) such that ∆ = 1 − x∆i −
s∆i > 0. We have:
fi(x
δ
i ) + pδs
δ
i − csδi − cxδi ≥ fi(x∆i ) + pδs∆i − cs∆i − cx∆i
that gives
fi(x
δ
i ) + pcs
δ
i − δsδi ≥ fi(x∆i ) + pcs∆i − δs∆i + c∆.
Hence,
lim
δ→0+
Up=pci (x
δ
i , s
δ
i )− Up=pci (x∆i , s∆i )
≥ lim
δ→0+
−δ + c∆
>0.
That is, strategy (xδi , s
δ
i ) outperforms all strategies (xi, si)
such that xi + si < 1, which means x
∗
i (pc) + s
∗
i (pc) = 1.
8.7 Proof of Lemma 4
Given p > pc, consider i such that s
∗
i (p) > s
∗
i (pc) ≥ 0.
From Lemma 3 we have x∗i (pc) + s
∗
i (pc) = 1. Since s
∗
i (p) >
s∗i (pc), x
∗
i (p) ≤ 1− s∗i (p) < 1− s∗i (pc) = x∗i (pc), i.e, x∗i (p) <
x∗i (pc).
Note that c ≤ ∂−fi(x∗i (pc)) ≤ ∂+x∗i (p), fi(xi) − cxi is
increasing in [0, x∗i (pc)]. So we must have fi(1 − s∗i (p)) −
c(1 − s∗i (p)) ≥ fi(xi) − cxi, for any xi ∈ [0, (1 − s∗i (p)]. So
far we have proved the lemma.
8.8 Proof of Theorem 3
We first give the result that both psw and pr are inside
region [pc, pupper].
Proposition 2. The following results hold.
• The social welfare under any p < pc is no more than
that under pc.
• Under revenue maximization policies, supply is always
no less than demand, i.e., S(pr) ≥ D(pr).
(a) We prove the first bullet in Theorem 3 here. For any
p1 > pc, we have S(pc) = D(pc), S(p1) ≥ D(p1). We want
to show that:∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i (p1), s
∗
i (p1)) +
∑
k∈R
U(y∗k(p1))
−
∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i (pc), s
∗
i (pc)) +
∑
k∈R
U(y∗k(pc)) ≤ 0
Note that for p ≥ pc (the revenue terms cancel out):∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i (p), s
∗
i (p)) +
∑
k∈R
U(y∗k(p))
=
∑
i∈O
[fi(x
∗
i (p))− csi − cxi] +
∑
k∈R
gk(y
∗
k(p)). (29)
For any renter k, we have:
gk(y
∗
k(p1))− pcy∗k(p1) ≤ gk(y∗k(pc))− pcy∗k(pc)
hence,
gk(y
∗
k(p1))− gk(y∗k(pc)) ≤ pcy∗k(p1)− pcy∗k(pc)
sum over all renters we have:∑
k∈R
gk(y
∗
k(p1))− gk(y∗k(pc)) ≤ pcD(p1)− pcD(pc) (30)
For owners, we discuss in two cases:
1. For i such that s∗i (p1) ≤ s∗i (pc), we have:
fi(x
∗
i (p1)) + pcs
∗
i (p1)− cs∗i (p1)− cx∗i (p1)
≤fi(x∗i (pc)) + pcs∗i (pc)− cs∗i (pc)− cx∗i (pc)
thus,
fi(x
∗
i (p1))− fi(x∗i (pc))
− cx∗i (p1)− cs∗i (p1) + cx∗i (pc) + cs∗i (pc)
≤pc(s∗i (pc)− s∗i (p1))
2. For i such that s∗i (p1) > s
∗
i (pc), from Lemma 4 we must
have x∗i (p1) + s
∗
i (p1) = 1 and 0 ≤ x∗i (p1) < x∗i (pc).
Thus,
fi(x
∗
i (p1))− fi(x∗i (pc))
− cx∗i (p1)− cs∗i (p1) + cx∗i (pc) + cs∗i (pc)
=fi(x
∗
i (p1))− fi(x∗i (pc))
≤∂−fi(x∗i (pc))(x∗i (p1)− x∗i (pc))
≤pc(x∗i (p1)− x∗i (pc))
=pc[(1− s∗i (p1))− (1− s∗i (pc)))]
=pc(s
∗
i (pc)− s∗i (p1))
Here the inequality is due to the concavity of f . Sum-
ming above two cases, we have:∑
i∈O
[fi(x
∗
i (p1))− fi(x∗i (pc))
− cx∗i (p1)− cs∗i (p1) + cx∗i (pc) + cs∗i (pc)]
≤
∑
s∗i (p1)≤s∗i (pc)
pc(s
∗
i (pc)− s∗i (p1))
+
∑
s∗i (p1)>s
∗
i (pc)
pc(s
∗
i (pc)− s∗i (p1))
=pc(S(pc)− S(p1)) (31)
Summing up (30) and (31) and using (29), we have:∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i (p1), s
∗
i (p1)) +
∑
k∈R
U(y∗k(p1))
−
∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i (pc), s
∗
i (pc)) +
∑
k∈R
U(y∗k(pc))
≤pcS(pc)− pcS(p1) + pcD(p1)− pcD(pc)
≤0
(b) By Proposition 2 and results above, we must have
pr ≥ psw. Part (ii) and Part (iii) also follow.
8.9 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (i) Consider the case when the price is p0 and
D(p0) > S(p0) (meaning p0 < pc). There exists some renters
who are not able to rent products since available products
are not enough. Let R0 denote the set of renters who have
successfully rented a product and R/R0 denotes the other
renters.
We know that Ui(yi) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ R0 and Ui(yi) = 0, yi =
0, ∀i /∈ R0, i ∈ R. According to Theorem 1, there exists
some market clearing price pc > p0 such that D(pc) = S(pc).
For owners, we must have each owner’s social welfare
Ui(xi) = fi(xi) + pcsi − cxi − csi increases compared to
the case when price is p0.
For renters in R/R0, each renter gains non-negative social
welfare increment. For renters in R0, each renter i suffers
utility lost not exceeding (pc − p0)y∗i (p0) even if they adopt
the same usage y∗i (p0) as at pc. Therefore total social welfare
lost for groupR0 will be bounded by (pc−p0)S(p0). However
for the owners who have served users in R0, they have at
least (pc − p0)S(p0) utility increment at price pc due to the
price increase even if they do not increase supply.
To sum up, the social welfare at lowest market clearing
price pc, is no less than the social welfare at any other prices.
(ii) According to Theorem 1, denote pc as the lowest mar-
ket clearing price. Consider any price p0 < pc and we have
D(p0) > S(p0). The volume of trade will be p0S(p0). Ac-
cording to Proposition 1, D(p) is continuous. Thus, there
exists some p1 > pc such that S(p0) = D(p1) and the volume
of trade will be p1D(p1) and we have p1D(p1) > p0S(p0).
8.10 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The first inequality is trivial. So we focus on the
second inequality. Consider psw = pc.
Denote U∗i (p) as i’s optimal utility and x
∗
i (p), s
∗
i (p) (for
i ∈ O) as his best response at price p. Then, x∗i (pr), s∗i (pr)
and x∗i (psw), s
∗
i (psw) are i’s best response usages and share
levels (for i ∈ O) at price pr and psw. The total demand
and total supply at price pr and psw are given by:
D(pr) =
∑
k∈R
y∗k(pr), S(pr) =
∑
i∈O
s∗i (pr)
D(psw) =
∑
k∈R
y∗k(psw), S(psw) =
∑
i∈O
s∗i (psw)
Note that total social welfare is given by:∑
i∈O
Ui(x
∗
i (p), s
∗
i (p)) +
∑
k∈R
Uk(y
∗
k(p))
=
∑
i∈O
[fi(x
∗
i (p))− cs∗i (p)− cx∗i (p)] +
∑
k∈R
gk(y
∗
k(p)).
We first consider renters’ social welfare. Since pr ≥ psw, for
any renter k, we have 0 ≤ y∗k(pr) ≤ y∗k(psw), and
gk(y
∗
k(psw))− gk(y∗k(pr))
≤∂+gk(y∗k(pr))(y∗k(psw)− y∗k(pr))
≤pr(y∗k(psw)− y∗k(pr).
The second inequality is obtained by the following. First, if
y∗k(pr) < 1, then
∂+gk(y
∗
k(pr)) ≤ pr, ∀k ∈ R
This holds because y∗k(pr) is chosen to maximize gk(yk) −
pryk. On the other hand, if y
∗
k(pr) = 1, then y
∗
k(psw) = 1.
Thus, the bound also holds.
Now summing up all renters’ social welfare:∑
k∈R
gk(y
∗
k(psw))− Uk(y∗k(pr)) ≤ pr(D(psw)−D(pr))(32)
After bounding renters’ social welfare, we now take a look
at the owners. Note that by Lemma 3, we have x∗i (pc) +
s∗i (pc) = 1.
1. For owners such that x∗i (pr) ≥ x∗i (psw), we have:
fi(x
∗
i (psw))− cx∗i (psw)− cs∗i (psw)
− fi(x∗i (pr)) + cx∗i (pr) + cs∗i (pr)
≤fi(x∗i (psw))− fi(x∗i (pr))
≤∂−fi(x∗i (pr))(x∗i (psw)− x∗i (pr))
≤0.
The last inequality holds since ∂−fi(x∗i (pr)) ≥ 0.
2. For owners such that x∗i (pr) < x
∗
i (psw), we must have
s∗i (pr) > s
∗
i (psw) and x
∗
i (pr) + s
∗
i (pr) = 1 from Lemma
4. Hence,
fi(x
∗
i (psw))− cx∗i (psw)− cs∗i (psw)
− fi(x∗i (pr)) + cx∗i (pr) + cs∗i (pr)
=fi(x
∗
i (psw))− fi(x∗i (pr))
≤∂+fi(x∗i (pr))(x∗i (psw)− x∗i (pr))
≤ prD(pr)S−i(pr)
(S−i(pr) + s∗i (pr))2
(x∗i (psw)− x∗i (pr))
≤prD(pr)
S(pr)
(x∗i (psw)− x∗i (pr))
=
prD(pr)
S(pr)
(s∗i (pr)− s∗i (psw))
The inequality here is because the marginal benefit
from sharing should be at least as good as that from
self-usage.
Summing up above two cases over all owners , we have:∑
i∈O
fi(x
∗
i (psw))− cx∗i (psw)− cs∗i (psw)
− fi(x∗i (pr)) + cx∗i (pr) + cs∗i (pr)
≤prD(pr)
S(pr)
∑
sri>s
sw
i
(s∗i (pr)− s∗i (psw)) (33)
Adding (33) and (32) together we have proved the theo-
rem.
8.11 Proof of Theorem 6
Suppose given p, let x1i , s
1
i and x
2
i , s
2
i denote i’s self us-
age and share at equilibrium, under 1, and 2, respectively.
Note that 0 ≤ 1 < 2.
We prove S2(p) ≥ S1(p) by contradiction with a similar
argument used in proving Theorem 3. Similar to Lemma 1,
we have:
∂+fi(x

i) ≤ dQi(si; p)
dsi
∣∣∣∣
si
+ p ≤ ∂−fi(xi) (34)
for i such that si < 1. Suppose S
2(p) < S1(p) (note that
in this case pD(p)
S1
> pD(p)
S2
). There must exists some i such
that his equilibrium supply s2i < s
1
i .
Let K = {i|s2i < s1i )}, we have K 6= ∅. Thus we
must have x2i > x
1
i , ∀i ∈ K. Otherwise we will have
U 2i (x
1
i , s
1
i ) ≥ U 2i (x2i , s2i ). We consider the following
cases.
1. If there exists some i ∈ K such that S2−i ≥ S1−i, we have
for i that:
dQi(s
2
i )
dsi
+ p2 =
pD(p)S2−i
(S2−i + s
2
i )
2
+ p2
>
pD(p)S1−i
(S1−i + s
1
i )
2
+ p1 ≥ ∂+fi(x1i )
≥∂−fi(x2i ).
Here the first inequality is obtained by S2−i ≥ S1−i and
S2−i+s
2
i = S
2 < S1 = S1−i+s
1
i . From (34) we know
that x∗i (pr), s
∗
i (pr) will not be a equilibrium strategy.
Contradiction.
2. If no i satisfies condition in step 1, we have S2−i <
S1−i, ∀i ∈ K. We will need to check if there exists i ∈
K satisfies S2−i ≥ s2i , i.e., s2i is smaller than others’
sharing at p under subsidy. For such i, we have:
dQi(s
2
i )
dsi
+ p2 =
pD(p)S2−i
(S2−i + s
2
i )
2
+ p2
≥ pD(p)S
1
−i
(S1−i + s
2
i )
2
+ p2 >
pD(p)S1−i
(S1−i + s
1
i )
2
+ p1
≥∂+fi(x1i ) ≥ ∂−fi(x2i ).
Here the first inequality is given by the fact that func-
tion q(x) = x
(x+k)2
is monotone decreasing in x ≥ k.
3. If no i satisfies the conditions in above two steps, i.e.,
S2−i < S
1
−i and S
2
−i < s
2
i for all i ∈ K. Note that
S2−i < s
2
i implies there exists at most one i in K in
this case. Since K 6= ∅, there is exactly one i′ ∈ K. By
the definition of K, we have s2j > s1j , ∀j 6= i. However,
we have S2−i > S
1
−i, which gives a contradiction.
In conclusion, we have S2(p) ≥ S1(p), and in particular,
S(p) ≥ S0(p).
8.12 Proof of Theorem 7
Suppose  > 0 and S(p) > S0(p). There must exists some
i such that si > s
0
i , which means x

i < x
0
i for such i. Thus,
according to Lemma 1 and (34):
dQi(si)
dsi
∣∣∣∣
s0i
≤∂−fi(x0i )
≤∂+fi(xi)
≤dQi(si; p)
dsi
∣∣∣∣
si
+ p,
Hence, we always have the following inequality:
pD(p)(S0(p)− s0i )
(S0(p))2
≤ pD(p)(S
(p)− si)
(S(p))2
+ p
≤ pD(p)(S
(p)− s0i )
(S(p))2
+ p (35)
If ∀i,  ≤ D(p)
S0(p)
(1− s0i
S0(p)
), i.e., the “small subsidies” regime
in Theorem 7, the above inequality gives the following result:
S(p) ≤ F () = D(p) +
√
M2 + 4D(p)s0i 
2[ D(p)
S0(p)
(1− s0i
S0(p)
)− ]
(36)
where M = D(p)(1− 2s0i
S0(p)
). In fact, one can verify that
S0(p) = F (0) (37)
Note that, by (36) and (37) we have S(p) ≤ S(p) + Θ(√).
For  such that  > D(p)
S0(p)
(1− s0i
S0(p)
) =
D(p)(S0(p)−s0i )
(S0(p))2
, the
following inequality always hold:
pD(p)(S(p)− si)
(S(p))2
+ p
>
pD(p)(S0(p)− s0i )
(S0(p))2
≥c
Hence, we always have xi(p) + s

i(p) = 1 (the “medium sub-
sidies” regime in Theorem 7).
Finally, if p +
pD(p)S−i
(S−i+1)2
≥ ∂+fi(0) (the “large subsidies”
regime in Theorem 7), we always have si = 1 since it is
always more beneficial to share. Thus, S(p) = NO.
